Епистемология на логиката и проблемът за логическия опит
Еpistemology of Logic and the Problem of Logical Experience

Summary/Abstract: The text aims to outline the perspective of Ludwig Wittgenstein's article “Some Remarks on Logical Form” (1929) by questioning the notion of logical experience and to show that where Wittgenstein discusses logical problems related to experience, the problems in fact belong to the epistemology of logic. It is emphasized that in 1929 there is an unpredictability of logical forms, and along with that there is a return to the notion of logical experience, which is denied in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Against this background, it is showed that in Philosophical Investigations, with the notion of grammatical observation as analogous to the notion of logical experience, the problem of unpredictability of logical forms extends into a problem of the unpregivenness of different logics of language games. The main conclusion of the text is that in the Tractatus it is impossible to speak of the epistemology of logic due to the denial of logical experience, but it is possible in 1929, through the introduction of aposteriority in the analysis of phenomena, as it is also possible in Philosophical Investigations (1953), but under the assumption that Wittgenstein is considered as a predecessor of the praxeological turn in logic.

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