Хайдегер и Бурдийо: предпредикатност и практическа логика
Heidegger and Bourdieu: Prepredicativity and Practical Logic

Summary/Abstract: This article is a contribution to the critical dialog on Heidegger and the Critique of Sociological reason started by Johannes Weiss, and is dedicated to Heidegger’s 1925–1926 lectures on logic. It identifies Heidegger as a predecessor of the praxeological turn in logic and as an inspirer of the analytic of prepredicative evidences of thought. In § 1, the emphasis is on the appropriation of Heidegger’s heritage by Bourdieu and on the poorly discernible and strongly ambivalent traces by which we can restore the contradictions in that appropriation. §2 deals with the Aristotelian apophantics — as presented in Heidegger’s lectures on logic — through the prism of what Austin calls illocutionary forces, and puts Heidegger’s discoveries under the microscope of the non-classical transcendental logic. §3, which is the essential problem of the article, criticizes Heidegger’s belief that the hermeneutical as such can be leveled out without residue in the apophantic as such, and insists that the so-called prepredicative evidences of thought itself, of the apophantic logos, are derivative forms of the prepredicativity of practical handling. § 4 raises the problem of method: how Heidegger’s method of formal indications can be mirrored in the opposition between what can be said and what can only be shown, as outlined by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. The article sets ho-pes on Heidegger’s 1925–1926 lectures on logic that they may offer a chance of productive dialogue between the reflexive sociology of Bourdieu and the ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel (as well as the conversation analysis of Harvey Sacks) on the problems of the theory of the logic of practice (to put it more generally: of the logic and methodology of the human sciences).

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