Масовна бекства робова у Тукидидовом Пелопонеском рату
Mass Flights of Slaves in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War

Summary/Abstract: Fleeing is the most common and well-documented type of slave resistance in ancient Greece. The frequency and magnitude of this social phenomenon naturally increased during times of instability, crisis or armed conflict. Therefore it is hardly surprising that our main narrative source for the history of Greece in the later 5th century BC, the monumental History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides, mentions several such episodes. Now, the Athenian historian obviously did not view the fleeing of slaves as events of the highest significance, events that would warrant mention on their own, let alone a lengthy discussion. Instead, every such episode is given in passing, as a part of some wider-reaching, more important affair. The first one is told in the context of the truce made in the spring of 423 BC. Among others, two sides agreed on the clause that “Fugitives will not be received during this time; neither free nor enslaved, neither by you nor by us” (Thuc. 4.118.7; my italics). If this clause was deemed necessary in such an agreement, it must mean that the mentioned activity was frequent: many fled to the other side in preceding years, including numerous slaves. When ill-fated Peace of Nicias was concluded in 421 BC it held no similar provision, perhaps because it was considered superfluous during peacetime. However, when (abortive) alliance between Athens and Sparta was signed soon after, the Athenians agreed to aid the Spartans in the case of servile insurrection, while demanding no similar commitment from their would-be allies (Thuc. 5.23.3). The Athenians seem to be confident in their ability to keep slaves under control. Such confidence was to be severely challenged in the later stages of the war. By far the most discussed and analyzed of the three episodes is the one that took place in Attica from 413 BC onward. Aided by the advice and information of Alcibiades, a force of Spartans and their allies, led by king Agis, took the north Attican village of Decelea and fortified it. From this stronghold, they were in a position to ravage the countryside and obstruct everyday life, work and traffic. The Athenians will not regain Decelea until the end of the war. Among many problems this created for them, massive desertion of slaves was especially concerning. Thucydides claims that over twenty thousand bondsmen ran off to join the Peloponnesian force in Attica – most of them skilled craftsmen (χειροτέχναι; Thuc. 7.27.5). These words of Thucydides were a subject of long lasting scholarly debate. Among many questions raised was the one about the accuracy of the number. How could Thucydides be in possession of such precise information, given that (so far as we know) Greek states had no census of slaves? Assuming that the information is at least roughly correct, it would mean that Athenians suffered a major loss of their workforce (again, it would be very helpful if we knew the total size of the slave population in Attica, but we do not, and probably never will). Other relevant questions remain unanswered as well: did the flight occur suddenly, within a limited window of opportunity (say, in the summer and autumn of 413 BC), or did it take place gradually, during the last nine years of the war? The identity of these fugitive slaves was likewise a matter of much debate. Many historians took word χειροτέχναι to signify workers in the mines of Laurium. This is perhaps implied by Thucydides (cf. Thuc. 6.91.7) but not stated outright. This identification is attractive, but there are many difficulties with it, not the least one being the comparative isolation of Laurium, and its considerable geographical distance from Decelea. Some historians therefore explored other possibilities: perhaps we are dealing here with fleeing craftsmen from the city or Piraeus or with agricultural works from the Attican countryside. Especially significant aspect is the Spartan handling of these fugitives. Early scholars assumed they were freed, perhaps employed by or even enlisted in the army at Decelea. After all, it stands to reason that the main motivation for flight was hope for freedom. The discovery of the first two fragments of Hellenica Oxyrhynchia in 1906 shattered this belief: the fugitives were not given freedom but were treated with ruthless pragmatism – they were (re)sold on the Theban slave market, to fill the war fund (Hell. Oxy. XVII (XII) 3–4). This is even more striking when we consider the Athenian treatment of absconding slaves in the final example. The Sicilian disaster in 413 BC was the hardest blow the Athenian Empire suffered so far in the war. It opened the possibility for a successful uprising on the part of the increasingly unwilling allies and subjects. Inability of the Peloponnesians to offer actual assistance to would-be insurgents in the Aegean and Ionia postponed such attempts until the next spring. In the meantime, the Athenians were able to partly recover from the shock of the Sicilian defeat, and also to receive some hints about the plans of their enemies. Thus, when the defection of allies in Ionia, led by the powerful and wealthy Chios, finally began, the Athenians were in a position to react with sufficient destructive force. By the late autumn of 412 BC there was an Athenian stronghold on Chios, mirroring in a way the situation in Attica, but with roles reversed. In fact, the Athenians were in position to deal even greater damage here than they suffered in their homeland, because in addition to devastation of the countryside, they imposed naval blockade on the island. Thucydides describes the bleak position of the Chians in the spring of 411 BC (Thuc. 8.40, 1–2). A significant part of their predicament was the fleeing of slaves en masse. Chios was among the wealthiest Greek city-states, in possession of multitudes of foreign (mostly Anatolian) slaves, who were overworked and generally treated harshly. Once they learned of the presence of a hostile force on the island, these people deserted their masters in droves. The Athenians set them free, armed them, then let them loose to plunder and burn the country estates of the Chians. They prove to be especially efficient and destructive in this, because of their knowledge of the land. The Athenians similarly freed the enslaved rowers on the Chian ships they captured (Thuc. 8.15.2). It is worthy to point out that for a long time they maintained the same policy towards the Messenian helots, whose defection they encouraged and whom they enlisted as foot soldiers and naval crews. What can we learn from these examples? For one, that mass flight of slaves was common in ancient Greece in times of war, and that there probably were many other cases, unmentioned by Thucydides. Both sides in the conflict seem to have a practical and tactical attitude toward such occurrences: they made efforts to use them as yet another weapon against the opposing side. There was no ethical or ideological principle involved in these actions, no group or class solidarity at display. Slaveholders directly encouraged the desertion of their enemies’ bondsmen, while fugitives gladly accepted assistance from people otherwise in possession of slaves. However, when it comes to the actual treatment of the fugitives two sides behaved inversely. The Spartans in Decelea encouraged and accepted runaway slaves, only to deny them freedom and to sell them immediately, for quick profit. The Athenians set their enemies’ slaves free and invited them to rejoin the struggle as free soldiers and sailors. In both cases the actions were directed by pragmatic considerations, but we are dealing here with two drastically different kinds of pragmatism.

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