DUALISM, MENTAL EXPLANATIONS AND EXPLANATORY EXCLUSION Cover Image

DUALIZAM, MENTALNA OBJAŠNJENJA I PRINCIP EKSPLANATORNOG ISKLJUČENJA
DUALISM, MENTAL EXPLANATIONS AND EXPLANATORY EXCLUSION

Author(s): Janko Nešić
Subject(s): Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind
Published by: Filozofsko društvo Srbije
Keywords: explanatory exclusion; causal exclusion; interactive dualism;

Summary/Abstract: Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE) generates the problem of mental explanation for dualism. Gibb argues that Kim’s principle is metaphysically implausible, but shows that a weaker principle EE* generates a similar problem for interactive dualism. In this paper I examine a possible dualistic response to arguments from EE and EE*. It is shown that both arguments from EE and EE* rest on the premises of the argument from overdetermination - causal exclusion and causal closure. Problem of explanatory exclusion can be reduced to the problem of causal overdetermination. I will show how an interactive dualist can make a plausible response to the argument from EE by rejecting the argument from causal overdetermination.

  • Issue Year: 56/2013
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 19-45
  • Page Count: 27
  • Language: Serbian
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