Saradnja Jugoslavije sa zapadnim silama u vreme normalizacije njenih odnosa sa socijalističkim lagerom 1956. godine
The Cooperation of Yugoslavia with the Western Forces at the Time of Normalization of its Relations with the Socialist Camp in 1956

Summary/Abstract: The political and economic basis for cooperation of Yugoslavia with the West, established in the time of the conflict with the USSR, has not been substantially changed even in the time of normalization of the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and frequent mutual leaders visits of the both countries during 1956. West powers have remained the crucial economic partners of Yugoslavia. The economic prosperity of the country depended on the cooperation with the West. The prevailing rules of behavior that determined these relations were not changed. Still any hint of normalization with Soviets was very negatively viewed by the West, stimulating always present suspect that Yugoslavia could have returned into the Soviet camp an misuse aid received. In that context, striking manifestations of friendship and ideological proximity during Tito-Khrushchev meeting in June 1956, provoked a great Western suspicion, as well as informal meetings of the two leaders in Belgrade and Krim several months later. Secret meeting at the Brioni before Soviet intervention in Hungary, additionally confirmed Western belief that Yugoslavia was about to change radically its foreign policy. Similar effect had an unconditional Yugoslav support for the course of the Soviet internal and foreign politics tahen at the 20th Congress. In order not to pay to high price of the uncertain friendship with the Soviet officials inclining toward hegemony, Yugoslav diplomats had a difficult task to explain to the Western powers the essence of the Belgrade’s new international strategy. However, this strategy had not been acceptable for the West before the first information about ever growing disagreement between Yugoslavs and Soviets regarding future principles of relations between the two states. The Yugoslav attempt to keep the equal distance toward both superpowers, brought the state into the confrontation with both blocks, for a while. In the long run however, Yugoslavia prepared the conditions for the later acceptance of this strategy, as the lesser of two evils. The second evil was the possibility that uncatchable Tito could have joined the another side.

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