A normalitás és az abnormalitás problémája Merleau-Ponty filozófiájában
The Problem of Normality and Abnormality in Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy

Summary/Abstract: Despite the aim of describing the general structure of human experience, first-generation authors of phenomenology relatively rarely write about the question of the normality of consciousness and experience. About distortions and modifications that do not fit into the general structure of the human experience or that question this general view. Normality is one of the most important operational concepts of transcendental phenomenology, yet Husserl in his works discusses it only sketchily, and even then, only from a constitutional point of view. For Heidegger, the topic does not really arise either, since it is unquestionable that the general structure of the Dasein is a normality constant, so we can only talk about the authentic and inauthentic way of existence. The first, more detailed thematization of the question, in my opinion, can be related to Merleau-Ponty’s early work, The Phenomenology of Perception. The concepts of normality-abnormality arise in this work mainly in connection with perception and the phenomenal body, as in Husserl’s, but here no longer in the paradoxical context of a constitutive consciousness and a psychophysical body, but in the meaning-creating function of an embodied consciousness. In this so-called existential context, both normality and abnormality are interpreted as the ability of the living body to adapt to the world. In the following study, I review three cases of pathological experience, analysed in detail in The Phenomenology of Perception, from which Merleau-Ponty’s above-mentioned existential perspective can be outlined.

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