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Logos Architekton. Journal of Logic and Philosophy of Science


Issue no.1-2 /2009


Publisher:

Presa Universitara Clujeana

  Address: 1, M. Kogalniceanu st., UBB, Philosophy Department
Cluj-Napoca (400084), Romania
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  eMail: logos.architekton@gmail.com

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 Articles 
    
The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate    
Realism, Relativity and Representation    
Vagueness and Paradox (Ontology at the Limit)    
Irrealistic Pluralism, Extensionalism, and Existence    
Paradoxes of logical realism    
The Meaning of the Logical Constants and Classical Negation    
Feyerabend on Fire: Analysis and Critique of Three Arguments    
Collectives as Theoretical Entities    
Intuition and synonymy – the extension of coverage of a concept    
On the effectiveness of Kalmár’s completeness proof for propositional calculus    
Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism: An Integrated Approach from Participant Stance and Affect    
Does Moral Discourse Require Robust Truth?    
Translated Title: Does Moral Discourse Require Robust Truth?
Publication: Logos Architekton. Journal of Logic and Philosophy of Science (1-2/2009)
Author Name: McDonald, Fritz J.;
Language: English
Subject: Philosophy
Issue: 1-2/2009
Page Range: 271-290
No. of Pages: 20
File size: 93 KB
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Summary: It has been argued by several philosophers that a deflationary conception of truth, unlike more robust conceptions of truth, cannot properly account for the nature of moral discourse. This is due to what I will call the “quick route problem”: There is a quick route from any deflationary theory of truth and certain obvious features of moral practice to the attribution of truth to moral utterances. The standard responses to the quick route problem are either to urge accepting a conception of truth more robust than deflationism (Boghossian 1990), or to revise deflationary accounts in order to block straightforward attribution of truth to moral utterances (Field 1994). I contend that neither of these standard responses is well-motivated, for it is a merit of deflationary accounts rather than a defect that such accounts present a quick route to moral truth.
Keywords: Deflationism; Truth; Realism; Antirealism; Metaethics; Expressivism