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Croatian Journal of Philosophy

Issue no.9 /2003



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The Revival of ‘Emergence’ in Biology: Autocatalysis, Self-Organisation and Mathematical Necessity    
Why Wittgenstein Ought to Have Been a Computationalist (And What a Computationalist Can Gain from Wittgenstein)    
Translated Title: Why Wittgenstein Ought to Have Been a Computationalist (And What a Computationalist Can Gain from Wittgenstein)
Publication: Croatian Journal of Philosophy (9/2003)
Author Name: Rey, Georges;
Language: English
Subject: Philosophy
Issue: 9/2003
Page Range: 231-264
No. of Pages: 34
File size: 124 KB
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Summary: Wittgenstein’s views invite a modest, functionalist account of mental states and regularities, or more specifically a causal/computational, re-presentational theory of the mind (CRTT). It is only by understanding Wittgenstein’s remarks in the context of a theory like CRTT that his insights have any real force; and it is only by recognizing those insights that CRTT can begin to account for sensations and our thoughts about them. For instance, Wittgenstein’s (in)famous remark that “an inner process stands in need of outward criteria” (PI:§580), so implausible read behaviorally, is entirely plausible if the “outward” is allowed to include computational facts about our brains. But what is especially penetrating about Wittgenstein’s discussion is his unique diagnosis of our puzzlement in this area, in particular, his suggestion that it is due to our captivation by “pictures” whose application to reality is left crucially under-specified. it is only by understanding. What sustains the naive picture is not a captivation by language, but, at least in part, our largely involuntary reactions to things that look and act like our conspecifics. We project a property into them correlative to that reaction in ourselves, and are, indeed, unwilling to project it into things that do not induce that reaction.
Yesterday’s Algorithm: Penrose and the Gödel Argument    
Common Sense Concepts: a Cartesian Proposal    
Notes on Hume and Skepticism of the Senses    
The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan’s Causal Compatibilism    
Interview with Professor Ivan Supek on the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik    
In memoriam Kathleen V. Wilkes (1946–2003)