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Croatian Journal of Philosophy

Issue no.9 /2003



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The Revival of ‘Emergence’ in Biology: Autocatalysis, Self-Organisation and Mathematical Necessity    
Why Wittgenstein Ought to Have Been a Computationalist (And What a Computationalist Can Gain from Wittgenstein)    
Yesterday’s Algorithm: Penrose and the Gödel Argument    
Common Sense Concepts: a Cartesian Proposal    
Notes on Hume and Skepticism of the Senses    
The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan’s Causal Compatibilism    
Translated Title: The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan’s Causal Compatibilism
Publication: Croatian Journal of Philosophy (9/2003)
Author Name: Bregant, Janez;
Language: English
Subject: Philosophy
Issue: 9/2003
Page Range: 305-320
No. of Pages: 16
File size: 83 KB
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Summary: It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation that rests on supervenience is an attractive theory. On the one hand, it secures uniqueness of the mental; on the other hand, it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalist view. However, Kim reminds us that anti-reductionists face the following dilemma: either mental properties have causal powers or they do not. If they have them, we risk a violation of the causal closure of the physical domain; if they do not have them, we embrace epiphenomenalism, which denies any sort of causal powers to the mental. So, either we violate the causal closure of physics, or we end up with epiphenomenalism.
The first two sections of the article describe the problem of causal exclusion and Kim’s causal dilemma. The last two introduce Horgan’s anti-reductionist answer and my objection to that answer.
Interview with Professor Ivan Supek on the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik    
In memoriam Kathleen V. Wilkes (1946–2003)