|
Epistemic virtues and transparency
|
|
 |
 |
|
|
|
|
Justified Concepts and the Limits of the Conceptual Approach to the A Priori
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Quest for Purity: Another Look at the New Wittgenstein
|
|
|
|
| Translated Title: |
The Quest for Purity: Another Look at the New Wittgenstein |
| Publication: |
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
(33/2011) |
| Author Name: |
Stokhof, Martin;
|
| Language: |
English |
| Subject: |
Philosophy |
| Issue: |
33/2011 |
| Page Range: |
275-294 |
| No. of Pages: |
20 |
| File size: |
127
KB |
Download Fee:
(only for
non-subscribers) |
4 Euro (€) |
| Summary: |
In his Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, Hartry Field attempted to revitalize the epistemological case against mathematical platontism by challenging mathematical platonists to explain how we could be epistemically reliable with regard to the abstract objects of mathematics. Field suggested that the seeming impossibility of providing such an explanation tends to undermine belief in the existence of abstract mathematical objects regardless of whatever reason we have for believing in their existence. After more than two decades, Field’s explanatory challenge remains among the best available motivations for mathematical nominalism. This paper argues that Field’s explanatory challenge misidentifies the central epistemological problem facing mathematical platonism. Contrary to Field’s suggestion, inexplicability of epistemic reliability does not act as an epistemic defeater. The failure to explain our epistemic reliability with respect to the existence and properties of abstract mathematical objects is simply one aspect of a broader failure to establish that we are epistemically reliable with respect to abstract mathematical objects in the first place. Ultimately, it is this broader failure that is the source of mathematical platonism’s real epistemological problems. |
| Keywords: |
philosophy of mathematics; epistemology of mathematics; mathematical platonism; explanatory challenge; Field |
|
|
|
|
|
Reassessing the Epistemological Challenge to Mathematical Platonism
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Marco Buzzoni: Thought Experiment in the Natural Sciences
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Peter Swirski: Literature, Analytically Speaking: Explorations in the Theory of Interpretation, Analytic Aesthetics, and Evolution
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Robert C. Stalnaker: Our Knowledge of the Internal World
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Stephen M. Gardiner: A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
