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Croatian Journal of Philosophy


Issue no.11 /2004


Publisher:

KruZak

  Address: Zastavnice 29
Zagreb/Hrvatski Leskovac (10251), Croatia
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 Articles 
    
Response–Intentionalism About Color: A Sketch    
The Knowledge Argument—Some Comments    
Translated Title: The Knowledge Argument—Some Comments
Publication: Croatian Journal of Philosophy (11/2004)
Author Name: Jutronić, Dunja;
Language: English
Subject: Philosophy
Issue: 11/2004
Page Range: 193-197
No. of Pages: 5
File size: 33 KB
Download Fee: 4 Euro (€)
Summary: The paper discusses Crane’s analysis of Knowledge argument, and sets forth author’s disagreement with Crane. Surely Mary learns something new when she sees a color for the first time. The time for a physicalist to quarrel comes only when a qualia person says that this experience represents special phenomenal facts, and that such understanding should be identified with propositional knowledge. We should not confuse ‘having information’ with having the same information in the form of knowledge or belief. Mary knows everything there is to know about color vision. The only thing she has not done is practically experience what it is like to see a color. Thus her knowledge gap is practical and not propositional.
Crane on the Mind–Body Problem and Emergence    
Tim Crane on the Internalism–Externalism Debate    
Crane on Intentionality and Consciousness: A Few Questions    
Summary of Elements of Mind and Replies to Critics    
Rationality and the Emotions    
On Wakker’s Critique of Allais–Preferences    
Some Epistemological Consequences of The Dual–Aspect Theory of Visual Perception    
The Contingent A Priori: Much Ado about Nothing    
T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility    
Pierre Jacob and Marc Jannerod, Ways of Seeing: The Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition